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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMPULSORY 

LICENSING IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
ROBERT STEPHEN LEE· 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement oj 
individual ejfort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents ojauthors and inventors in "Science and 
usiful Arts. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to encourage the development of the arts and sciences, 
the framers of the United States Constitution granted Congress the 
authority to enact copyright legislation. The framers intended to 
give authors and inventors exclusive property rights to their writings 
and discoveries for limited periods of time. 2 This protection has 
been justified as an obligation society owes to the creator of a pro­
tected object and as a means of promoting the general well-being of 
society.3 Granting creators exclusive rights to their works is viewed 
as desirable because it is believed that artistic production cannot be 
expected to go forward, or public consumption of artistic works en­
joyed, unless creative resources first are distributed to the separate, 
authoritative governance of the creators themselves.4 
Traditionally, it also has been argued that creators have a natu­
• Staff Attorney, Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. Department of Labor; 
B.A., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1977; J.D., Western New England Col­
lege School of Law, 1980; MLT, Georgetown University Law Center, 1982. 
I. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
2. "The Congress shall have Power ... (t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times·to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3. Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale ofCopyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 
421 (1966). 
4. This philosophy may be attributed to the social functionary theories of property. 
According to such views, property is necessitated because of human inability to sustain, 
in the absence of property rights, an acceptable milieu for production and consumption 
of goods. As a social functionary, the property owner is viewed as a steward and, there­
fore, has no moral claim to any given state of property distribution or income. See, e.g. , 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. II, chs. 3, 5, at 58, 62-74 (Sinclair ed. 1962); Michelman, Prop­
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ral right to the fruits of their labors.5 The creation and protection of 
a property right in an author's work is viewed as desirable because 
under such a regime, creators are able to obtain and keep what is 
due them.6 Further, it is contended that artists have a moral right to 
have their creations protected as extentions of their personalities.7 
Finally, it is believed that authors have a right to be compensated for 
their contributions to society.8 
Despite these justifications for exclusive property rights, both 
the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act)9 and the current Copyright Act 
of 1976 (1976 Act)lO contain compulsory licensing provisions. These 
provisions not only deny creators the exclusive right to use their 
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations oj "Just Compensation" 
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1206-7 (1968). 
5. Breyer, The Uneasy Case jor Copyright: A Study oj Copyright in Books, Photo­
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970). 
6. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale jor Copyright Protection jor Published Books: 
A Reply to Professor Breyer, 21 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1,2 (1974). 
In a speech to the House of Commons in 1841, Lord Macaulay stated, "The law of 
nature. . . gives to every man a sacred and indefeasible property in his own ideas, in the 
fruits of his own reason and imagination." 8 T. MACAULAY, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
LORD MACAULAY 195 (1866). 
7. Breyer, supra note 5, at 289-90; Tyerman, supra note 6, at 2. This moral justifi­
cation for property rights is known as one of the personality theories of property rights. 
Under this view, it is believed that production should be regarded as an end in itself and 
property as an indispensible arrangement to reach that end. See, e.g. , Michelman, supra 
note 4, at 1205. 
This property theory should not be confused with the concept of moral rights or droit 
moral which purports to protect the personal as distinguished from the economic rights 
of creators. Moral rights include the right of an individual to create and publish, or not, 
in any form desired; the right of the creator to present himself before the public as such; 
and the right of a creator to modify his work and to prevent deformation of it. Roeder, 
The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law ofArtists, Authors and Creators, 53 
HARV. L. REV. 554, 556 (1940). 
8. The concept of personal property rests on ingrained societal customs stemming 
from an original, historic perception that individuals would derive some benefits from 
mutual forbearance to interfere with the possessions of others. According to this view, 
property is a collection of accepted rules governing the exploitation and enjoyment of 
resources. Property, therefore, becomes the institutionally established understanding 
that current rules governing the relationship among individuals with respect to resources 
will continue to exist. Under this theory, any new distribution of property or change in 
the property rules is a disappointment to an individual relying on these property rules. 
To avoid frustrating those individuals who have relied on established property rights, 
compensation must be paid to those individuals when, through a change in property 
rules, society takes what those individuals once possessed. Michelman, supra note 4, at 
1210-13. See generally J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION chs. 7-10 (6th ed. 1890); 
D. HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. II, §§ 2-4, at 436-59 (Dolphin 
paperback ed. 1961). 
9. Ch. I, § I(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976). 
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). 
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works as they wish, but also require them to do business with per­
sons not of their own choosing and to accept statutorily established 
rates at statutorily mandated intervals for the use of their works. II 
Consequently, while the 1976 Act grants creators exclusive property 
rights in their works, these rights are limited by the compulsory li­
censing provisions. 
This article will trace the development of the compulsory licens­
ing provisions in copyright law. It will analyze the current status of 
this concept in light of economic notions of contract and property 
law. It also will examine the government policy of encouraging use 
of copyrighted works through reliance on compulsory licensing ar­
rangements. Finally, it will be contended that compulsory licensing 
is an inefficient method of allocating the right to use a creator's 
work, and that the concept's continued presence in modem copyright 
legislation is justified only through historical reasoning. 
II. DEVELOPi~ENT OF COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS 
Congress first extended federal copyright protection to original 
musical compositions in 1831.12 Anyone possessing such a copyright 
had the exclusive right to sell copies of the musical score. Individu­
als purchasing copies of the composition usually did so in order to 
play the work at home on the piano or other musical instrument. 13 
Between 1831 and 1909, however, numerous machines were invented 
that allowed the musical work to be mechanically reproduced. 14 
Mounting sales of these new machines detracted from the value of 
the copyright granted for the musical composition because individu­
als having such devices had little need for sheet music. 15 
The problems created by this new technology eventually 
reached the Supreme Court of the United States in White-Smith Mu­
sic Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 16 In White-Smith, defendant Apollo 
manufactured piano rolls capable of mechanically reproducing two 
copyrighted songs, "Little Cotton Dolly" and "Kentucky Babe 
Schottische," which had been published previously in the form of 
II. Id §§ lll, 115, 116, 118. 
12. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1909); see L. PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 197-202 (1968). 
13. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 564-66 (1973). 
14. Id 
15. Id 
16. 209 U.S. I (1908). The White-Smith Court applied a visual test of a copy of a 
musical composition within the meaning of the 1909 Act. The Court defined a copy as "a 
written or printed record of [the composition) in intelligible notation." Id at 17. 
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sheet musicP In hope of a decision recognizing mechanical repro­
duction rights, several music publishers granted the Aeolian Com­
pany exclusive, long term licenses to manufacture perforated music 
rolls in consideration for Aeolian's pursuing the White-Smith in­
fringement action as far as the Supreme Court. IS These contracts 
were to become effective upon the recognition of mechanical repro­
duction rights by Court decision or congressional enactment. 19 The 
White-Smith Court, however, held that the piano rolls were not cop­
ies of the copyrighted music under the then existing federal copy­
right law, but were merely components of a machine that played the 
musical works.20 As a result, Congress was confronted with a di­
lemma. Congress either could give exclusive rights to musical copy­
right owners for the mechanical reproduction of their works, thereby 
allowing the creation of what was referred to as a great music trust, 
or it could withhold these rights, causing great injustice to creators.21 
Despite these fears of monopolization, the 1909 Act, for the first 
time, recognized recording and mechanical reproduction rights as 
part of the bundle of exclusive rights secured by copyright law.22 
The 1909 Act, however, did not ignore the potential for monopoly in 
the event that the Aeolian Company's contracts became effective. It 
17. Id at B. 
lB. HOUSE COMM. ON PATENTS, To AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE THE ACTS RE­
SPECTING COPYRIGHT, H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. B (1909) [hereinafter 
cited as 1909 HOUSE REPORT]; Henn, Study No.5, The Compulsory License Provisions of 
the u.s. Copyright Law, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIG.HTS, 
B6TH Cong., 1ST Sess. 3 n.20 (Comm. Print 1956), reprinted in I OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT 
REVISIONS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1960). 
19. Henn, supra note IB, at 3 n.20. 
20. 209 U.S. at lB. 
21. 1909 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at B; Ringer, Copyright in the 1980s, 23 
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 299, 304 (1976). 
22. Some of the exclusive rights granted by the 1909 Act were the rights to "print, 
reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work;" translate or arrange the copy­
righted work; "deliver, authorize the delivery of, read or present the copyrighted work in 
public for profit;" "perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly;" and to "make 
any arrangement or setting of [a musical composition] or of the melody of it in any 
system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be 
recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced." Ch. I, § I(e), 35 Stat. 1075 
(repealed 1976). 
The recognition of recording and mechanical reproduction rights, however, was only 
partial. Instead of deciding whether phonograph records and piano rolls should be con­
sidered copies of the composition recorded, the House Committee stated that: "It is not 
the intention of the Committee to extend the right of copyright to the mechanical repro­
duction themselves, but only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the control, in 
accordance with the provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and use of such devices." 
1909 HOUSE REPORT, supra note IB, at 9. It was not until February 15, 1972, that sound 
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resolved this problem by devising a special provision to allow any 
manufacturer of recordings or mechanical reproductions to use a 
musical composition as long as the manufacturer paid a royalty to 
the copyright owner for use of the work.23 
In this way, compulsory licensing in copyright law was intro­
duced and, with it, a continuing controversy arose over its validity.24 
recordings were given copyright protection. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 
391 (repealed 1976). 
In contrast to the 1909 Act, the exclusive rights guaranteed by the 1976 Copyright 
Act are as follows: 
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individ­
ual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy­
righted work publicly. 
17 U.S.c. § 106 (1976). 
23. Ch. I, § I(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976); Ringer, supra note 21, at 304. Al­
though the compulsory license provision of section I(e) was the first oftwo instances of a 
compulsory license in federal copyright and patent enactments, it was not entirely with­
out precedent. Congress had no power over copyright under the Articles of Confedera­
tion. Congress, therefore, recommended in 1783 that the states enact their own copyright 
legislation. Of the 12 original states which did so between 1783 and 1786 (Delaware 
being the exception), four states (Connecticut, Georgia, New York, and South Carolina) 
passed statutes containing compulsory license provisions which were applicable when 
copies of a copyrighted book were not supplied in reasonable quantities and at reason­
able prices. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906, at 11-31 (2d 
ed. 1906); Fenning, Copyright Before the Constitution, 17 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 379-83 
(1935); Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright; The "Exclusive Rights" Tensions in 
the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 215, 224-25 (1977). 
24. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISIONS, H.R. REP. 
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 HOUSE REPORT], 
reprintedin 17 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 
1976), which cites the arguments raised in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COpy­
RIGHT LAW REVISIONS, H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-7 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as 1967 HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in II OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLA­
TIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976). It has been argued that the Constitutional refer­
ence to copyright as the "exclusive right" casts some doubt on the constitutionality of 
provisions establishing rights lacking in exclusivity such as compulsory license provi­
sions. See, e.g. , Henn, supra note 18, at 19 n.66. In 1909, Congress responded as follows: 
The great weight of opinion, however, is the other way. It is true that Congress 
could not legislate a man's existing rights out of existence, for thereby it would 
impair the obligation of contract; but in this case Congress is creating a new 
property right, and in creating new rights Congress has the power to annex to 
them such conditions as it deems wise and expedient. 
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The Copyright Office itself has recommended that the compulsory 
licensing concept in copyright be abandoned.25 During the develop­
ment of the 1976 Act, music publishers echoed many of the basic 
arguments against compulsory licensing. They contended that com­
pulsory licensing no longer is needed to meet the special antitrust 
1909 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 9. 
Nathan Burkan, former general counsel of the American Society of Composers, Au­
thors and Publishers (AS CAP), during testimony on one bill that would have eliminated 
the compulsory licensing provision of § I(e) altogether, Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 
11258 bifore the House Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 148-68 (1925) (statement 
of Nathan Burkan), contended that compulsory licensing was arbitrary and discrimina­
tory class legislation which forced authors to do business with persons not of their own 
choosing, id at 149, 164, at terms contrary to those specified in section I(e) (since the 
statutory rate, being considered a ceiling price, was not reached in many contract negoti­
ations), and without any means of enforcing their claims against unknown record produ­
cers. Id at 158. During later Congressional hearings in which Mr. Burkan questioned 
the constitutionality of compulsory licensing, he explained the failure of anyone to make 
an attack on section I(e) in the courts as follows: 
Unquestionably this act was so artfully drawn, that if an attack was made upon 
the compulsory provisions of the act and the court declared them unconstitu­
tional, the whole act would have to fall. That would have left the authors in the 
same plight they were in from 1888 to July 1909. 
Bill to Amend the Copyright Act, Hearings on S. 2328 and H.R. 10353 bifore the Joint 
Commillee on Patents, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1926) (statement of Nathan Burkan). 
25. The 1961 Register of Copyrights Report recommended that the provision be 
retained for one year and then be eliminated. 
Removal of the compulsory license would be likely to result in a royalty 
rate, fixed by free negotiation, of more than the present statutory ceiling of 2 
cents. The record companies would, of course, lose the advantage of the lower 
rate. The price of records to the public might be increased by a few cents, 
though this is not certain since many factors enter into the pricing of records. If 
it is true that a freely negotiated rate would exceed 2 cents, we would conclude 
that the 2-cent ceiling denies authors and publishers the compensation due 
them for the use of their works. 
We have previously mentioned the fundamental principle ofcopyright that 
the author should have the exclusive right to exploit the market for his work, 
except where this would conflict with the public interest. In the situation pre­
vailing in 1909, the public interest was thought to require the compulsory li­
cense to forestall the danger of a monopoly in musical recordings. The 
compulsory license is no longer needed for that purpose, and we see no other 
public interest that now requires its retention. 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT 
LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION 
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 35 (Comm. Print 1961) (hereinafter cited as 1961 REGIS­
TER'S REPORT), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. 
Grossman ed. 1964); see also Blaisdell, Study No. 6, The Economic Aspects ofthe Compul­
sory License, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES 
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS. 91 (Comm. Print 1958), reprinted in I OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1960). This excellent early study also con­
tended that compulsory licensing be abandoned. 
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problems that existed in 1909.26 They also questioned the rationale 
that singled out certain intellectual property, such as music, for com­
pulsory licensing in opposition to fundamental concepts of prop­
erty.27 Finally, they argued that music publishing is not a public 
utility and that establishment of a statutory fee for a product wholly 
produced and distributed within the private sector of our economy is 
an incongruity.28 Nevertheless, through the whole range of national 
and international regimes since 1950, the compulsory licensing con­
cept consistently recurs.29 
Compulsory licensing usually is adopted as a compromise meas­
ure in revising and developing copyright legislation.30 Superficially, 
the compulsory licensing system looks fair. The author and copy­
right owner get paid for their work. The user, however, who has a 
strong argument that what he is doing represents the public interest, 
cannot be prevented from using the work.3l Consequently, compul­
sory licensing normally is offered as a compromise to copyright con­
troversies in two situations. First, compulsory licensing is offered 
when technology has created new uses for which the author's exclu­
sive rights have not been clearly established.32 It also is used when 
technology has made old licensing methods for established rights 
ponderous or inefficient.33 Under the 1976 Act, such compromises 
have resulted in four compulsory licensing provisions concerning: 
Secondary transmissions by cable television systems;34 mechanical 
royalties;35 jukeboxes;36 and public broadcastingY This expansion 
26. 1967 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 66. 
27. Id 
28. Id at 67. 
29. Ringer, supra note 21, at 306. 
30. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 107, where it is stated that the 
system of compulsory licensing "represented a compromise of the most controversial is­
sue of the 1909 Act ...." Id 
31. Id 
32. Id at 303. 
33. Id 
34. 17 U.S.C. § III (1976). Section III establishes a compulsory license for secon­
dary transmissions by cable systems. Under this provision, the secondary transmission to 
the public of distant, copyrighted, non-network programs by a cable system is subject to 
compulsory licensing. Before the cable system may make such secondary transmissions, 
however, section 111(d)(I) requires that at least one month before the commencement of 
operations, the cable system must record in the Copyright Office a notice including a 
statement giving the identity and address of the cable system owner along with the name 
and location of the primary transmitter whose signals are regularly carried. Subsection 
(d)(2) directs cable systems whose secondary transmissions have been subject to compul­
sory licensing to deposit with the Register of Copyrights a semi-annual statement of ac­
count specifying the number of channels on which the cable system made secondary 
transmissions to its subscribers, the names and locations of all primary transmitters 
210 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:203 
led Barbara Ringer, the former Register of Copyrights, to predict 
that as we enter the 1980's, copyright will become less the exclusive 
right of an author and more a system under which the author is 
guaranteed some remuneration for his work but is deprived of any 
whose transmissions were carried by the system, the total number of subscribers to the 
system, and the gross amounts paid to the system for the basic service of providing secon­
dary transmissions. Cable systems are also required to deposit royalty fee payments for 
the period covered by the statements of account computed on the basis of specified per­
centages of gross receipts from cable subscribers. During the month of July of every 
year, anyone claiming to be entitled to compulsory license fees must file a claim with the 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal. After the first day of August of each year, if the Tribunal 
determines that there is no controversy as to the payment of royalties, it may distribute 
these fees after deducting reasonable administrative costs. Royalties are paid only for the 
retransmission of distant, non-network programming. No royalty fees may be claimed or 
distributed to copyright owners for the retransmission of either local or network pro­
grams. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 88-101. 
35. 17 U.S.c. § 115 (1976), establishes a compulsory license for phonorecords. It 
basically follows the provisions of sections l(e) and IOI(e) of the former copyright stat­
ute. Under this provision, a musical composition that has been reproduced in pho­
norecords with the permission of the copyright owner may generally be reproduced in 
phonorecords by another person, ifhe notifies the copyright owner and pays the specified 
royalty. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 107-11. 
36. The compulsory licensing provisions in section 116 were patterned after those 
in section 115. In contrast to section 115, however, section 116 not only provides "the 
operator of the coin-operated phonorecord player" with the opportunity to obtain "a 
compulsory license to perform the work publicly on that phonorecord player," but also 
specifically exempts under certain conditions "the proprietor of the establishment in 
which the public performance takes place." The owner-operator of the jukebox is re­
quired to file in the Copyright Office an application containing certain information and 
must also deposit with the Register of Copyrights an eight dollar royalty fee for each 
machine. Individuals who believe they are entitled to royalties because their works have 
been played on jukeboxes, must file a claim with the Copyright Royalty Tribunal in 
January. The royalties may be distributed after the first of October and after reasonable 
administrative costs have been deducted, if the Tribunal determines that there is no con­
troversy concerning the distribution of the royalty fees. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976); 1976 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24 at 111-15. 
37. 	 17 U.S.C. § 118 (1976). 
During its consideration of revision legislation in 1975, the Senate Judici­
ary Committee adopted an amendment offered by Senator Charles McC. 
Mathias. The amendment, now section 118 of the Senate bill, grants to public 
broadcasting a compulsory license for use of nondramatic literary and musical 
works, as well as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, subject to payment of 
reasonable royalty fees to be set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal established 
by that bill. The Mathias amendment requires that public broadcasters, at peri­
odic intervals, file a notice with the Copyright Office containing information 
required by the Register of Copyrights and deposit a statement of account and 
the total royalty fees for the period covered by the statement. In July of each 
year all persons having a claim to such fees are to file their claims with the 
Register of Copyrights. If no controversy exists, the Register would distribute 
the royalties to the various copyright owners and their agents after deducting 
reasonable administrative costs; controversies are to be settled by the Tribunal. 
1976 HOUSE REpORT; supra note 24, at 116. 
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control over the use to which the works are being pUt.38 Ringer also 
suggested that we have reached the point where any new rights 
under copyright law that may develop because of future technologi­
cal advances cannot be exc1usive.39 
III. BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS 
Whatever the force of these criticisms, several economic ques­
tions remain concerning the continued use of compulsory licensing. 
First among these is whether compulsory licensing is efficient. This 
efficiency criterion has been described as a means of "exploiting eco­
nomic resources in such a way that 'value'-human satisfaction as 
measuredby aggregate consumer willingness to payfor goods and serv­
ices-is maximized."40 When resources shift in a voluntary transac­
tion, it may be presumed that the shift involves a net increase in 
efficiency because the transaction would not have occurred if both 
parties did not expect to gain. With involuntary transfers, however, 
that may occur as the result of compulsory licensing, the question of 
efficiency is not so easily resolved. It must be asked whether, and in 
what circumstances, an involuntary exchange may be said to in­
crease efficiency.41 
38. Ringer, supra note 21, at 303. Indeed, Thomas C. Brennan, Chief Counsel of 
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademark and Copyright has stated that the 
dominant trend in copyright legislation in Congress is reliance on the compulsory license 
to facilitate access to copyrighted materials by potential users. Brennan, Some Observa­
tions on the Revision of the Copyright Lawfrom the Legislative Point of View, 24 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 151, 152 (1977). Many inconsistent positions were taken in Congress 
during discussion of the compulsory license provisions. In describing the mood of Con­
gress during the hearings and debates on these provisions, Brennan stated that, 
"[m)embers of Congress who usually proclaim the virtues of the market place were pro­
moting government intervention, while well-known civil libertarians were insisting that 
an author must not be allowed to prevent the public performance of his work." Id 
39. Ringer, supra note 21, at 306. A case in point has been the recent discussion of 
whether new typeface designs should be copyrighted and whether compulsory licenses 
should be used to guar..ntee access to these new designs. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1975 REVISION BILL OCTOBER-DECEMBER 
1975, at 15-21 (Draft 1978). 
40. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in origi­
nal); see also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972). It should be noted that 
the goal of economic efficiency is just one way of analyzing and developing legislation. It 
should also be recognized that the "efficiency criterion" itself is partially inadequate in 
examining legislation because numerous other considerations may be involved. Never­
theless, it does help provide "one view of the cathedral." Id 
41. R. POSNER, supra note 40, at 10-11; see generally Coase, The Problem ofSocial 
Cost, 3 1.L. & ECON. I (1960). 
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A second economic consideration is that of externalities. Often, 
the economic activities of one individual impinge on the welfare of 
another without the intervention of any market transaction between 
them. Economists characterize these situations as instances of exter­
nality: "[S]ituations in which markets fail to mediate interactions 
between individuals ...."42 For example, externalities result when 
a record purchaser plays his record at a party and his guests enjoy 
the music. Similarly, externalities occur when an individual reads a 
newly purchased book to her friends. In both situations, third par­
ties enjoy the benefits of the artists' labors without paying for that 
enjoyment. If externalities result from a transaction within a market 
system, however, the market allocation may not be efficient. While a 
change in resource use may improve the situations of some individu­
als, it may have external effects that actually may damage the situa­
tions of individuals not involved in the market transaction.43 The 
goal of economic efficiency, sometimes called Pareto optimality,44 
however, is to choose the set of legal rights that will "lead to that 
allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that 
a further change would not so improve the condition of those who 
gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and 
still be better off than before."45 Consequently, three major methods 
for the control of externalities have evolved to meet this efficiency 
criterion: Use of private contract; reliance on the property protecting 
provisions of the common law; and resort to direct government con­
tro1.46 Therefore, the question for compulsory licensing, a form of 
42: Krier & Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form of 
Government Intervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89 (1973). 
43. D. ORR, PROPERTY, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 288 (1976); 
see generally Coase, supra note 41. 
44. Pareto optimality is an equilibrium position in static economic analysis. An 
equilibrium position is "pareto-optimal" if (and only it) there is no possible movement 
from it that could make everyone better off. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 462 n.12 (10th 
ed., 1976); E. SHOWS & R. BURTON, MICROECONOMICS 568 (1972). It should be noted 
that Pareto optimality and the general efficiency criterion are not technically syno­
nomous in that Pareto optimality is used to describe a static situation while general effi­
ciency criterion seeks to determine what an individual, who is effected by a resource shift, 
will consider to be the most desireable allocation of those resources. 
45. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 40, at 1094. 
46. See D. ORR, supra note 43, at 289. 
The use of private contract to control externalities may be demonstrated in the fol­
lowing classic example: An orchard owner lives next to a bee keeper. Because the bees 
pollinate the orchard owner's fruit, the orchard owner's fruit harvest is greater than it 
would be without the bees. The value conveyed to the fruit grower is not recognized by 
the bee keeper and, thus, does not influence his decision on how many hives he should 
keep. The fruit grower's pollinated orchard is an external economy from the bee keeper's 
production of honey. If, however, these activities are pursued at too small a scale so that 
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direct government control, is whether it is an efficient and effective 
controller of externalities. 
A third economic issue in compulsory licensing is that of com­
petition. The basic condition of competition requires that every par­
ticipant in the market process behave as if price were unaffected by 
the participant's decisions regarding how much he should purchase 
or produce.47 If this and other basic conditions are met, the long run 
equilibrium of an industry will have three important characteristics. 
First, the cost of producing the last unit of output, the marginal cost, 
will be equal to the price paid by consumers for that unit.48 This 
condition is necessary for profit maximization because of the compe­
titive firm's belief that its output decisions do not affect price. Sec­
ond, because price will be equal to the average total cost for the 
representative firm, above normal profits are absent.49 As a result, 
investors receive returns just sufficient to keep investments at the 
level required to produce the industry's equilibrium output effi­
ciently.5o Finally, if an industry is competitive, each firm will pro­
duce at its lowest possible cost or else be driven from the industry.51 
Thus, competition allows resources to be used at maximum produc­
mutual benefits are ignored, the problem can be rectified through a merger or through 
other forms of private contract. The bee-keeping activity will then be carried out at a 
scale which reflects the gains resulting from pollination and the sale of honey. Id at 286, 
289. 
Similarly, reliance on the property protecting provisions of the common law also 
controls externalities. The classic example hypothesizes two farmers, one raising cattle 
and the other growing corn. The cattle owner finds it impossible to keep his cattle out of 
the corn at all times. Nevertheless, the common law provides that the cattle owner must 
compensate the corn grower for any damage done by the cattle. This law encourages the 
cattle owner to reduce his herds and to build stronger fences tC' keep his cattle away from 
the corn. This, in turn, causes less damage to the corn grower's crops and, thus, will 
mean lower production costs for him. The cattle owner's decision to decrease his herd is 
a decision having external effects on the corn grower. The property protection provided 
by the common law, however, helps control the external effects of the cattle owners deci­
sion. As with the bee-keeper example, the externalities may be internalized if one farmer 
purchases the land of the other so that the new property owner's decisions concerning the 
amounts of cattle to keep and grain to grow will no longer affect the selling farmer-land 
owner. Coase, supra note 41, at 2-4. 
Finally, use of direct government intervention as a controller of externalities may be 
exemplified by a government statute that prohibits certain activities (such as burning 
bituminous coal) or requires other activities (such as use of pollution control devices on 
automobiles) in order to reduce air pollution. D. ORR, supra note 42, at 292. 
47. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM­
ANCE 8-26 (1970). 




214 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:203 
tion efficiency. 52 
The final economic issue in compulsory licensing is that of 
transaction costs. This term is central to the body of economics con­
cerned with the formation, exchange, and enforcement of property 
rights.53 Broadly conceived, it includes the "costs of interacting par­
ties identifying each other, informing each other of a willingness to 
deal, carrying out and memorializing negotiations, and enforcing the 
resulting agreement."54 This concept may be refined further by 
breaking it down into three components: Information costs, the costs 
of gaining and communicating the necessary information to achieve 
an efficient allocation of a given resource; contracting costs, the costs 
associated with contract negotiations to reach a final agreement; and 
policing costs, the costs of enforcing and administering the new and 
potentially beneficial resource allocations. 55 
It has been argued that, assuming perfect competition, perfect 
information, and no transaction costs, the allocation of resources in 
an economy will be efficient and unaffected by legal rules regarding 
the initial impact of costs resulting from externalities. 56 Transac­
tions, however, require money and because substitutes for transac­
tions also are costly, the optimal result is not necessarily the same as 
if transactions had no costs. 57 The goal in resource allocation, there­
fore, is to approximate, both closely and cheaply, the result the mar­
ket would bring about if bargaining were costless.58 The problem 
then becomes making the choice between the methods that most ac­
52. Id 





56. See Coase, supra note 41. Coase's work quickly led to critical responses by 
Wellisz, On External Diseconomies and the Government Assisted Invisible Hand, 31 
ECONOMICA (N.S.) 345 (1964), and Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: An Approach to 
Non/ault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965). Calabresi, however, later 
withdrew his criticism in Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability 
Rules-A Comment, II 1.L. & ECON. 67 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Transaction Costs). 
Coase's critics alleged that his theorem neglected long run considerations. For example, 
if farmers or ranchers are required to bear the risk of liability for their activities in the 
long run, they will leave farming. Hence, even if transaction costs are zero, the market 
may allocate resources differently in the long-run depending upon which liability rule is 
chosen. Critics also charged that Coase's theorem endorsed the use of resources for the 
undesirable purpose of extortion. See, e.g., Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability 
Maller?, I 1. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972); Regan, The Problem ofSocial Cost Revisited, 15 
1.L. & ECON. 427 (1972). 
57. Transaction Costs, supra note 56, at 69. 
58. Id 
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curately and inexpensively accomplish this goal. 59 Whatever device 
is used, be it reliance on contract and property law or government 
intervention, it must be determined whether the system's costs are 
worth the benefits in the resource allocations that it causes.60 
IV. COMPULSORY LICENSING: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN 
THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OF CREATORS 
Government intervention in resource allocation usually occurs 
because of market breakdowns.61 Such was the situation when the 
first compulsory licensing provision relating to the mechanical repro­
duction of musical compositions was introduced into federal copy­
right law.62 Although this set of circumstances may have justified 
passage of the compulsory licensing provision of section 1 ( e) in 
1909,63 economic theory will support the compulsory licensing con­
cept only if it adequately substitutes for competition and provides 
the least expensive control of externalities and transaction costS.64 
It has been contended that the government has powers that 
might enable it to accomplish this control at a lower cost than could 
a private organization.65 Indeed, it may be argued that through the 
use of compulsory licensing, the government is the lowest cost con­
troller of externalities. For example, when a person plays a jukebox 
59. Id 
60. Id at 68-69. Recognizing that one or more of the conditions necessary for 
Pareto optimality cannot be satisfied, some individuals have questioned whether encour­
aging conformity to the competitive model is the second best alternative. Lipsey & Lan­
caster, The General Theory ofSecond Best, 24 REV. ECON. STU!). II (1956). Depending 
on the circumstances of a situation, it quite possibly is not the best alternative. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that 
[Olne may decide that the whole question of allocative efficiency is so con­
fused and uncertain, once second-best considerations are introduced, that pol­
icy-makers should give up trying to achieve the best possible allocation of 
resources and base their choices on other criteria, such as equity of income dis­
tribution, compatibility with political beliefs, conduciveness to production effi­
ciency, and speed of technological progress. This is a step unpalatable to most 
economists . . . . 
F. SCHERER, supra note 47, at 26. 
61. Transaction Costs, supra note 56, at 69-70; Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProp­
erty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967); Krier & Montgomery, supra note 42, at 
102. 
62. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text. 
63. See Henn, supra note 18, at 1-12, for a history of the passage of the compulsory 
licensing features of the 1909 Act. 
64. See generally Transaction Costs, supra note 56, at 70-1, where it is stated that 
monopoly laws are believed to be "cheaper than market correction would be, and more 
important, we believe they are cheap enough to be worth having." Id 
65. Coase, supra note 41, at 17. 
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in a public place, he provides external benefits to the other patrons 
because they may listen to the music without paying. The external 
benefits provided to the other patrons are not reflected in the price 
paid for the music. If the enjoyment of the music by all the patrons 
could be measured, the value of hearing one selection might equal 
several dollars. To maximize efficiency in allocating this resource, 
the jukebox and copyright owners could decide to raise the price of 
playing one song to three dollars. Thus, the value of the music 
would be maximized because the amount received for the music 
could equal the benefits given. Unfortunately, the burden, or trans­
action cost, to one patron in soliciting quarters from all those who 
wished to hear the music might be so high that little if any music 
would be played. Thus, reliance on compulsory licensing may be 
justified as a way of accommodating the interests of copyright own­
ers who wish to maximize the value of their works with the public's 
interest in obtaining music at reasonable prices. By establishing a 
maximum royalty rate, compulsory licensing may insure the copy­
right owner a fair return for his work and may provide the public 
with music at low cost. 
The effectiveness of compulsory licensing as a controller of ex­
ternalities, however, is uncertain. This is because compulsory licens­
ing generally applies to copyrightable subjects that may be 
experienced by people in groups. In the jukebox hypothetical, for 
example, the jukebox may play all night long. Instead of one indi­
vidual paying for the music, there may be reciprocity among the pa­
trons. Each may contribute a proportionate share toward the cost of 
providing music in the establishment for the entire evening. Thus, 
rather than viewing each decision to play the jukebox in isolation, it 
may be more accurate to view all of the patrons as a single customer. 
As a result of each patron's paying for what the music is worth to 
him for the evening, there actually may be no externalities. 
If externalities do exist in the jukebox example, however, it is 
not certain that compulsory licensing is a satisfactory alternative to 
private contract. The external benefits provided to the nonpaying 
listeners may not be reflected in the price paid for the music. Reli­
ance on compulsory licensing still may not reflect these externalities 
because of primary administrative concern with the transaction be­
tween copyright owner and music purchaser, and government need 
for uniform regulations which cannot reflect the individual differ­
ences among compositions. As a result of these externalities, less 
music may be purchased than people may desire, and the amount 
returned to the jukebox and copyright owners may be artificially 
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low. Consequently, compulsory licensing may result in fewer re­
sources being expended to make music available to the public. 
Thus, the public may be left with a more limited selection of musical 
works. 
Although it is debatable whether government intervention best 
controls externalities, its intervention in the allocation of the use of 
creative resources may be justified as a method of controlling trans­
action costS.66 The enactment of compulsory licensing for noncom­
mercial broadcasting, for example, was justified as a means of 
avoiding "administratively cumbersome and costly 'clearance' 
problems that would impair the vitality of ... [such broadcasters'] 
operations."67 Further, in the jukebox hypothetical it was suggested 
that compulsory licensing may reduce the transaction costs of decid­
ing whether to playa musical selection. Because compulsory licens­
ing establishes the maximum royalty that may be paid, a patron may 
playa song without having to solicit contributions from others who 
also may enjoy the music. 
Direct government control of compulsory licensing, however, 
has its drawbacks. Government intervention usually occurs because 
of market breakdowns.68 The primary costs associated with govern­
ment intervention through compulsory licensing are: Information 
costs, the costs of obtaining and communicating the knowledge nec­
essary to achieve a more efficient allocation of a given resource; and 
policing costs, the costs of enforcing this new knowledge or of ad­
ministering these potentially beneficial resource allocations.69 While 
resources such as musical compositions and television programs may 
be sufficiently valuable to justify government intervention, their 
value may be so small that the gains resulting from an efficient allo­
cation by the government are not worth the information costs associ­
ated with achieving them. 
Uniform regulations have been used to reduce information 
costS.70 Because of these uniform regulations, all jukebox operators 
are required to pay to the Register of Copyrights eight dollars each 
66. The Committee on the Judiciary justified using the compulsory license in sec­
ondary transmissions by cable systems as a way to reduce transaction costs by providing 
that, "The Committee recognizes. . . that it would be impractical and unduly burden­
some to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work 
was retransmitted by a cable system." 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 89. 
67. Id at 117. 
68. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text for a brief history of the eco­
nomic conditions leading to the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909. 
69. Krier & Montgomery, supra note 42, at 96. 
70. Id at 102. 
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year for every jukebox owned.71 This royalty is then paid to copy­
right owners and to performing rights societies.72 Similarly, compos­
ers or publishers are compelled to allow anyone to use their 
compositions who is willing to pay the statutory rate of either "two 
and three-fourths cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of play­
ing time or fraction thereof, whichever amount is larger."73 
Use of uniform regulations, however, is inherently inefficient. 
Individual consumers are better equipped to determine how much a 
product is worth to them. The allocative inefficiency caused by uni­
form standards could be controlled by obtaining information on in­
dividual variations in demand.74 The costs associated with a 
centralized response to create variable standards, however, would be 
75enormous. Consequently, any gains in allocative efficiency would 
be lost through increased information costs. Thus, the inefficiency 
associated with uniform regulations may be counterbalanced by the 
savings resulting from the minimal need for information.76 
The allocative inefficiency resulting from the use of uniform 
regulations can be seen in the compulsory licensing provision of sec­
tion 115 of the 1976 Act, which concerns the making and distribution 
of phonograph records.77 This provision sets the maximum rate that 
a composer or publisher may charge a record company for the use of 
a musical composition.78 Although a record manufacturer may con­
tract with the composer or publisher to pay less than the statutory 
ceiling, the composer or publisher may not demand more than the 
ceiling rate.79 A musical composition may be worth more to the rec­
ord manufacturer than the 1976 Act requires him to pay, resulting in 
an inefficient allocation of resources because the artificially low rate 
of return will attract fewer resources.80 Attempts by Congress or the 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, the administrative agency charged with 
periodically reviewing and adjusting these statutory royalty rates,81 
to consider these individual variables may be too costly. 
71. 17 U.S.c. § 116(b)(I)(A) (1976). 
72. Id § 116(c)(4). 
73. Id § 115(c)(2). 
74. Krier & Montgomery, supra note 42, at 97. 
75. Id at 9S. 
76. Id 
77. 17 U.S.c. § 115 (1976). 

7S. Id § 115(c)(2). 

79. Id As a practical matter, some recording companies actually begin recording 
before clearing the rights. Negotiated licenses are usually attempted before resorting to a 
compulsory license. Henn, supra note IS, at 56. 
SO. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 40, at 10. 

SI. 17 U.S.C. § SOl (1976). 
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The lowest cost controller of transaction costs in negotiations 
between a composer and a record company may be the contracting 
parties themselves. They already may have paid the expenses of lo­
cating each other to bargain and may have gone through other nego­
tiations in an effort by the record manufacturer to get a royalty fee 
lower than the statutory ceiling. Use of a government agency to re­
view and enforce the statutory rates may serve only to increase trans­
action costs. 
Although it has been shown that the use of compulsory licens­
ing may not guarantee lower transaction costs or more effectively 
controlled externalities,82 these provisions might be justified if they 
encouraged competition. The primary reason behind adoption of 
the first compulsory licensing provision in the 1909 Act was the fear 
of monopoly in the mechanical reproduction and recording indus­
tries.83 Proponents of compulsory licensing, therefore, attempt to de­
fend it as a means of preventing any supplying firm from obtaining a 
dominant share of the market, keeping a large number of firms en­
gaged in supplying the market so that suppliers cannot conspire to 
restrain trade, and preventing the establishment of legal or financial 
barriers to any new firm that wishes to enter the industry.84 
In the recording industry, compulsory licensing no longer ap­
pears necessary to spur competition. Fears that recording monopo­
lies may restrict their outputs, obtain high returns for their products, 
and prevent others from reducing those profits by bringing close sub­
stitute goods to the market, no longer seem tenable. There are now 
hundreds of record companies competing for the record purchaser's 
dollar.85 Undaunted, supporters of compulsory licensing maintain 
that it enables smaller record companies to compete with larger com­
panies by allowing them to record the same music.86 Granting all 
record companies access to the same musical compositions, however, 
may have the effect of limiting the number of songs that are re­
corded.87 As all record companies generally concentrate on the same 
compositions, the songs must either be complete successes or total 
82. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text. 
84. D. ORR, supra note 43, at 208. 
85. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 33. 
86. Id 
87. Letter from Herman Finkelstein, former ASCAP General Counsel, to the 
Copyright Office on the Compulsory License Provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law 
(Sept. 25, 1956), reprinted in I OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
(G. Grossman ed. 1960). 
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failures.88 There is little in between because, unless a song is re­
corded, there is no market for it.89 Compulsory licensing actually 
may tend to discourage competition, as a small record company can­
not get the full benefit of a hit song it may" create because a large 
record company may follow immediately with a recording of the 
same song by a more outstanding artist.90 If the compulsory licens­
ing provision were not in effect, record manufacturers could get ex­
clusive rights to a particular song, forcing other manufacturers to 
work on different compositions.91 There also would be little danger 
that the large companies would get all the hits because the popular 
music available for recording is practically inexhaustible, and any 
composition has some chance of becoming a hit.92 
Proponents of compulsory licensing also maintain that without 
such a provision, creators will be able to monopolize their works and 
deny public access to them.93 Removal of compulsory licensing, 
however, would not necessarily result in exclusive licenses being 
given. If it is true that authors and publishers benefit from multiple 
recordings of their music, presumably, they would seek to give 
nonexclusive licenses to several companies.94 Further, the granting 
of a copyright to a creator does not give a monopoly in his particular 
medium of expression. "[I]t is basic to copyright law that anyone 
else is free to create another original writing in the same subject mat­
ter, so long as he does his own creative work."95 Thus, without com­
88. Id 
89. Id 
90. Evidence of the large amount of rerecording and arranging of hit songs may be 
seen in a New York Times article which reported that approximately 40 artists had re­
corded their own versions of Gilbert O'Sullivan's hit, Alone Again (Naturally). Along 
with versions by Johnny Mathis, Andy Williams, Jerry Vale, Jim Nabors, Woody Her­
man, and Doc Severinson, there was a jazz version by Hank Crawford, a country-music 
rendition by Brush Arbor, and a religious treatment by Anita Bryant. N.Y. Times, Sept. 
7, 1973, at 45, col. 1. 
91. Letter from Herman Finkelstein, supra note 89. 
92. 1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 34. 
93. But see id at 33, where it is stated that "the antimonopoly reason for the com­
pulsory license is gone ...." Id 
94. Id at 34. 
95. Letter from Cedric W. Porter as part of the Comments and Views submitted to 
the Copyright Office on the Compulsory License Provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law 
(Oct. 1, 1956), reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. 
Grossman ed. 1960). 
Copyright has sometimes been said to be a monopoly. This is true in the 
sense that the copyright owner is given exclusive control over the market for his 
work. And if his control were unlimited, it could become an undue restraint on 
the dissemination of the work. 
On the other hand, anyone work will ordinarily be competing in the mar­
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pulsory licensing, those who wished a particular kind of intellectual 
property could attempt to purchase the good from the creator, or 
create or purchase a substitute. 
Government regulation in the form of compulsory licensing 
may be justified if it improves efficiency by resolving difficulties of 
negotiations so that all parties are enabled, and required, to take into 
consideration all costs or missed opportunities for mutual benefit en­
tailed by their courses of action, before they decide to embark on 
them.96 The problem with government controls, however, is that 
they are inflexible. They are based on a false, implicit premise that 
everyone should behave in the same way for the sake of the public 
welfare.97 The inflexibility of direct legal control actually may cause 
a reduction in the public welfare.98 This inefficiency may be com­
pounded because of increased government expenditures for the crea­
tion and support of administrative agencies to supervise these 
regulations.99 The inefficiency, however, does not stop here. These 
fallible administrative agencies are subject to political pressures and 
operate without any economic check. Hence, the regulations issued 
may not lead to increased efficiency in the economic system. 100 Nev­
ertheless, while it may be true that compulsory licensing does not 
promote efficiency by encouraging competition or minimizing trans­
action costs and externalities, it still must be demonstrated that reli­
ance on contract and property law principles as embodied in 
traditional copyright law will provide a better economic alternative. 
V. 	 RELIANCE ON CONTRACT AND PROPERTY LAW AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO COMPULSORY LICENSING 
Legal protection of property rights has the important economic 
function of creating incentives to use resources efficiently. 101 Ac­
ket with many others. And copyright, by preventing mere duplication, tends to 
encourage the independent creation of competitive works. The real danger of 
monopoly might arise when many works of the same kind are pooled and con­
trolled together. 
1961 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 5. 
96. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1174-75. 
97. D. ORR, supra note 43, at 256, 292-93; see supra notes 90-91 and accompanying 
text. 
98. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1976) which created the Copyright Royalty Tribunal 
to periodically review and adjust statutory royalty rates for the use of copyrighted mater­
ials pursuant to compulsory licenses. 
100. Coase, supra note 41, at 18. 
IO\. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 40, for a discussion of why 
capitalist property rights develop. 
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cording to some economic theorists, the creation of exclusive and 
transferable rights is a necessary condition for this efficient resource 
use.102 The property right should be exclusive so that the owner may 
use his property as he wishes.103 The property right also should be 
transferable so that resources may be shifted from less valuable to 
more valuable uses through voluntary exchanges. 104 Through a suc­
cession of such transfers, resources shift to their most valuable uses, 
thereby maximizing efficiency. lOS Property rights, however, are 
never exclusive because exclusive property rights often could be in­
compatible. I06 Consequently, this economic theory of property 
rights implies that rights will be redefined as the relative values of 
different resource uses change. 107 The law may resolve this incom­
patibility either by recognizing a property right in the party whose 
use is more valuable or by imposing liability on the other party.108 
Arguably, the 1976 Act, through reliance on compulsory licensing, 
has attempted to resolve the potential incompatibility of exclusive 
property rights in artistic creations with society's need for such 
works. Subjecting creators' exclusive rights in their works to com­
pulsory licensing implies that society's access to these works is more 
valuable than the creators' rights to use their works as they wish. 
The use of compulsory licensing appears to depart from the constitu­
tional language referring to the possible grant of exclusive rights in 
copyrightable works. 109 This redefinition of property rights also may 
fail to promote economic efficiency. By requiring creators to let any­
one use their works, rather than allowing creators to deal with those 
individuals they believe will not distort or damage their works or 
reputations, much duplication of effort may result and the public 
may get products of poor quality. I 10 Creativity may be discouraged 
by the thought that the public will face potential exposure only to 
shoddy or distorted versions of the original. I II Creativity also may 
102. See supra notes 7-8. 
103. R. POSNER, supra note 40, at 12. 
104. Id at 13. 
105. Id at 27-31. 
106. Id at 34. 
107. Id at 38; Coase, supra note 41. 
108. See Michelman, supra note 4, at 1182. 
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
110. See Roeder, supra note 7, at 565-72 for a discussion of the right to prevent 
distortion of one's work. 
III. The European concept of moral rights allows redress for the distortion of an 
artist's work. American copyright law, however, does not recognize moral rights or pro­
vide a cause of action for their violation. Courts have, therefore, had to rely on various 
theories outside the copyright law to provide creators with some remedy. See, e.g., 
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be discouraged by the rate ceiling set by the compulsory licensing 
provisions. 112 These provisions do not respond to the public's will­
ingness to pay more for the creators' works. 113 Thus, the value to the 
creator of his own work may not be maximized. Granting the crea­
tor an exclusive property right in his work not subject to compulsory 
licensing, however, may provide the artist or author with an incen­
tive to use his work efficiently. In addition, if the creator will benefit 
from increased public exposure, it is probable that the public will 
have the same access to new works as it does under the compulsory 
licensing provisions of the 1976 Act. 
Contract law, like property law, helps maintain incentives to use 
resources efficiently. While serving the important function of hold­
ing people to their promises,114 it also reduces the complexity and 
hence, the cost, of transactions by supplying a set of normal terms 
that in the absence of the contract law, the parties would have to 
negotiate expressly.1I5 Finally, contract law furnishes prospective 
transacting parties with information concerning the many contingen­
cies that may defeat an exchange and, therefore, assists them in plan­
ning their exchange sensibly.1I6 
The principal economic function of contract law is to reduce 
transaction costs and, thereby, encourage efficient resource use. 1I7 
Reliance on contract law has the added advantage of giving the ne­
gotiating parties flexibility. I IS The compulsory licensing provisions 
also retain these benefits to the extent that they encourage the copy­
right holder and the prospective user to negotiate for fees below the 
statutory ceiling. 119 Further, if the statutory rate is adopted as a 
standard term in written agreements, transaction costs also may be 
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lanham Trade-Mark 
Act); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (contract theory of misrepresentation); 
Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939) (tort theory of 
unfair competition). 
112. 17 U.S.c. § 115(c)(2) (1976). 

1 i3. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 

114. "Ordinarily the failure of one party to a contract to fulfill the performance 
required of him constitutes a breach of contract for which he is liable in damages to the 
other party." Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related J)octrines in Contract Law: 
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1971). 
115. Id. at 88. 
116. Id. at 87-8. 
117. Id. at 88-9. 
118. Id. at 89. 
119. One writer has suggested that Congress intended to encourage parties subject 
to the compulsory license provisions to reach agreements through private negotiations 
rather than through reliance on the compulsory license provisions. Brennan, supra note 
38, at 153. 
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reduced because one less term need be negotiated. The statutory fee, 
however, is merely a maximum. Copyright users can bargain to pay 
less for the creator's work, but the author cannot bargain for 
more. 120 In addition, if the parties do not reach an agreement, trans­
action costs are increased further by the existence of administrative 
machinery that will enforce a legislatively created agreement on the 
negotiating parties. 121 As a result, the value of the creator's work is 
not maximized because he must allow others to use his work at a 
statutorily established rate. Consequently, compulsory licensing as 
one form of fixed contract terms is not sufficiently valuable to out­
weigh its harm. 
Contract and property law also are effective controllers of exter­
nalities. Nearly every transaction can be said to have a myriad of 
third-party effects, many of which stem from differences in taste and 
preference. 122 For example, an individual who plays a recording for 
his guests at a party provides his guests with the external benefit of 
being able to enjoy the music without having to purchase the record­
ing themselves. Because of these externalities, however, the royalty 
return to the copyright owner may be artificially low. As a result, the 
value of the music has not been maximized because individuals have 
been able to enjoy the music without paying for it. Absent the com­
pulsory licensing provisions, the composer and record company 
could consider the externalities that would result from a popular re­
cording to establish the price for the work. 123 Under compulsory 
licensing, however, negotiation above the ceiling royalty rate is not 
permitted. 124 Consequently, reliance on private contract should con­
trol externalities more effectively and may more closely achieve effi­
cient resource use. 
In addition to controlling externalities that result from 
nonmarket transactions, reliance on contract and property law also 
may control third-party effects through the pricing system in market 
transactions. 125 Indeed, it is ridiculous to assume that parties bar­
gaining for the use of a copyrighted work do not consider the effects 
that their agreement will have on others. The creator of the work 
120. 1967 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 72-73. 
121. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1976) which created the Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal. 
122. D. ORR, supra note 43, at 299. See also Demsetz, supra note 61, at 348; Krier 
& Montgomery, supra note 42, at 89. 
123. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of externalities. 
124. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
125. D. ORR, supra note 43, at 287. 
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generally wants maximum public exposure so that more copies of the 
work may be sold. Therefore, the creator will not demand exorbi­
tant prices which might limit exposure of the work to the public. 
With new works of unascertainable value, it is also questionable 
whether, in an effort to get public exposure, the creator would grant 
any party exclusive rights to use the work. Instead, the creator may 
grant exclusive licenses to use the work to one company for a limited 
period or may grant nonexclusive licenses to several companies for 
the use of his work. If a new artist grants the exclusive rights to use 
his work to an individual or firm, that does not prevent others from 
bargaining with the new copyright owner to obtain the right to use 
the work. Further, individuals wishing to use copyrighted materials 
may attempt to obtain the right to use the works at prices low 
enough so that the public can enjoy the presentation of the work, be 
it through records, cable television, jukeboxes, or public broadcast­
ing. This need, coupled with the creator's desire to get public expo­
sure for his work, should insure that the public has access to new, 
creative works at reasonable prices. Any increase in the price of the 
right to use copyrighted works reached during negotiations between 
a copyright owner and a potential user will be the result of market 
pressures which indicate that third parties would be willing to 
purchase the goods even at the increased price. 126 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Economists and policymakers have tended to overestimate the 
advantages that come from government regulation. 127 This principle 
is demonstrated clearly by the compulsory licensing provisions re­
tained in the 1976 Act. While developed, in 1909, at a time when 
there was a threat of monopolization and antitrust laws were in their 
infancy,128 this concept has not only been allowed to continue to ex­
ist well past the time that such fears were extinguished, but also has 
been allowed to expand into other areas of copyright law. Indeed, 
the trend has been to expand the concept. This trend has resulted 
from the political compromises that have been necessary to establish 
the new property rights required by technological advances. Rather 
than make a new property right exclusive, the right has been limited 
by compulsory licensing in order to guarantee public access to the 
126. Id at 299. 
127. Coase, supra note 41, at 18. 
128. See Blaisdell, supra note 25, at 110-11. 
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new works of creative persons. 129 
Despite this trend, continued adherence to the compulsory li­
censing scheme should be reexamined. The existence of externalities 
and transaction costs in the negotiations for creative works does not 
mean, necessarily, that government intervention in these transactions 
is needed. Transaction costs and externalities may be equally well 
controlled during private negotiations by contract and property law. 
Besides the inherent inefficiency of the uniform regulations found in 
the compulsory licensing provisions, the expense of supporting ad­
ministrative agencies to enforce these regulations only serves to in­
crease transaction costs. Finally, compulsory licensing actually may 
discourage competition by preventing creators of newly copyrighted 
works from reaping the full benefit of their efforts. Any other threats 
to competition, such as monopolization, can be resolved by reliance 
on the antitrust laws, which have been successful in the regulation of 
other businesses. 
Although compulsory licensing already may be a firmly estab­
lished part of public broadcasting and the record, jukebox, and cable 
television industries, the concept should not be expanded to other 
areas. In its absence, the owner of a copyrighted work will be able to 
limit licensing for the use of his work to individuals with whom he 
wants to deal, limit the time period for the use of his work, and 
freely negotiate the price charged for such use. The ultimate result 
will be efficiency in granting the right to use copyrighted materials. 
129. Ringer, supra note 21, at 304. 
